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The paper addresses the problem of representation of the 
processes of change in dynamic systems, specifically focusing 
on the mechanisms of feedback and plasticity. How 
adequately can diagrams and schemas explain temporal 
relations and predict behavior in exceedingly complex 
systems? How can we know and render visible what happens 
in between the discrete moments in which decisions are 
made? How does the material medium of signal transference 
affect the resulting mechanisms and schemas that represent 
them? The aspect of representation forms here a special 
tension with what Andrew Pickering (in reference to 
cybernetics) names performative epistemologies and ontology 
of unknowability. In this paper I explore the ways of 
describing the mechanisms of signal transference and 
feedback loops in three different types of systems – neuronal 
network, electro-chemical assemblage, and live organism, 
each of which represents different scale and principles of 
biophysical organization. In particular, I consider Warren 
McCulloch's diagrams of neural circuits, Gordon Pask's and 
Stafford Beer's experiment with chemical computers 
developing new senses, and a work by a Russian art collective 
“Where the Dogs Run”, in which the activity of a live mouse 




In this paper I concentrate on the concepts of feedback 
and plasticity as lenses for exploring processes of self-
organization and decision-making in systems as diverse 
as neuronal circuits, an electro-chemical assemblages, 
and live organisms. By examining closely the nuances 
of their work I aim to demonstrate the potential of these 
concepts as analytical tools applicable to broader 
humanistic research. The initial connections within 
cybernetics between computational and cognitive 
sciences have proven their implications for psychology 
and wider social sciences; whereas the studies of 
plasticity within neuroscience have stimulated 
discussions in the humanities about the political and 
ethical connotations of the brain’s ability to repattern 
itself. For instance, as acknowledged by Catherine 
Malabou, the adaptive and relational nature of neuronal 
structures (e.g. Spike-Timing-Dependent Plasticity, or 
STDP) may be instrumental in the transformation of the 
conception of the self as a fixed entity towards 
understanding of it as fluid and plastic, with a potential 
for creativity and freedom. [1] Yet, this provokes many 
questions, such as: What and where exactly is (if at all) 
a “self”, or “subject” of change in case of neuronal 
activity? How to represent the dynamic process in a 
static image? And more generally: How does the 
material medium of signal transference and its spatial 
conditions affect the resulting mechanisms and schemas 
that represent them? I propose to address these 
questions by comparing cases of visual manifestation of 
dynamic relations in cybernetics research (Warren 
McCulloch's diagrams of neural circuits, and Gordon 
Pask's and Stafford Beer's experiment with chemical 
computers) and media art (“1, 4 ... 19” by “Where the 
Dogs Run”). But first, let us take a closer look at some 
of the most critical aspects around the issues of 
feedback, plasticity, control, and representation.  
 
Feedback as Enactment of Plasticity 
Human brains, live organisms and artificial systems are 
independent complex domains, different in scale and 
constituting elements, yet they can be related, 
particularly in terms of behavioral and adaptation 
mechanisms, issues of agency, control, and – what is 
most interesting for me here – decision-making 
processes. It was the study of feedback that initially 
allowed scientists to approach neural nets as trainable 
machines, and thus to create parallels between the 
realms of the organic and the artificial, modeling the 
latter after the former. Feedback, communication and 
control were the central interests of cybernetics; and 
one of the main goals of comparison of these processes 
in living organisms, machines and organizations was to 
reveal the capabilities for learning and self-
management.  
 These systems were interpreted in terms of the 
epistemic autonomy of their behavior, i.e. ability to 
develop qualitatively new functions without external 
guidance. It is epistemic because it reflects decision-
making, or “thought” processes that occur during 
feedback loops. In cybernetics, it was the “margin of 
error” that was needed to correct the behavior, and in 
that case the feedback is called negative, i.e. “the 
signals from the goal are used to restrict outputs which 
would otherwise go beyond the goal.” [2] The behavior 
is considered a “non-feedback” when “there are no 
signals from the goal which modify the activity of the 
object in the course of the behavior”. [3] The principle 
of feedback loops is, thus, the basis of algorithmic 
processes as decision-making mechanisms that are first 
of all time-based. [4] Another important aspect raised 
by cybernetic theory is the relation between the 
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information (a “thought”) and its medium, the chains of 
“decisions” and the material of their implementation. 
Either in case of neuronal, or electrochemical activity 
(the growth of metallic iron threads between electrodes 
in Pask's experiment) the “decisions” are made and 
corresponding events happen within the matter itself. 
Information – in a form of electrical signals – does not 
serve here as a purely abstract concept of exchange, but 
rather as an instigator of simultaneous individuation of 
both thought and matter. [5] This view is the opposite 
of the dominant definition of information as a signal, 
formalized by Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener, 
who conceptualized it as an entity distinct from the 
substrates carrying it. [6] The material, embodied, 
situated and performative qualities of information and 
its transference is (once again) a subject of vibrant 
discussions in today's media studies, computer science 
and cognitive neuroscience. Likewise, self-organization 
theory does not only imply abstract algorithms, but is 
materially grounded. 
 Feedback is an operational principle and describes not 
a static, but a dynamic relation: it has to be enacted. 
There is an element of dialectics in this statement that 
may be critical for understanding the ontological 
dimensions of self-organization and plasticity - the 
processes that take place prior to their evaluation by an 
external observer. The notion of “principle” assumes 
certain pre-determined connections that can also be 
called virtual (from virtus – strength, potential, 
something existing in potential, not actuality). These 
virtual, or potential connections can, then, be either 
actualized/realized or not. But how to discover the 
hidden, not-yet-realized qualities? How to describe 
them scientifically and visually? Aside from 
mathematical graphs, what are the other forms of 
representing all the possibilities at once? What is the 
difference between existing in potential and in actuality 
and how does it matter for thinking about plasticity, 
self-organization, and the “self”/ “subject” itself? 
 The word “plasticity” etymologically derives from 
“plastic”, from Greek plassein, “to model” or “to 
mold”. As an adjective, plastic means “to be susceptible 
to changes of form”, or “to be malleable”, i.e. capable 
of receiving and of giving form. Form itself is the 
potential “other” that the initial substance can “take on” 
or become. “Taking form” is similar here to 
“organization”: to acquire an observable structure that 
keeps an entity (or “whole”) in balance. Form 
negotiates the liaison between the inside and the outside 
and maintains the integrity and internal cohesiveness of 
the structure. As Catherine Malabou shows, the concept 
of plasticity – as describing transformation of form – 
challenges the relationship between “self” and “other”: 
“plasticity renders possible the appearance or formation 
of alterity where the other is absent... Plasticity 
designates the form of a world without any exteriority.” 
[7] The “other” is already within the “self”, and only 
needs to be triggered in a certain way to reveal itself. 
 The “other” plays a role in feedback relations only if 
the self can recognize it as such and respond to it, and 
in this sense it should be already a part of the self. As 
Lacan points out, “This discourse of the other is not the 
discourse of the abstract other, of the other in dyad... it 
is the discourse of the circuit in which I am integrated. I 
am one of its links.” [8] Hence, feedback helps us to re-
envision the concept of the self – to see it not as an 
entity, but a circuit, a set of flexible links, both actual 
and potential. The concept of the circuit, similarly to 
plasticity (in some way), helps to surpass the classical 
dichotomies of subject-object relations and the 
principles of power dynamics imbedded in them. 
Instead, it may offer a form of organization and more 
flexible and inclusive structuring. 
 This brings us back to the question of how to describe 
and represent these links, especially those that are not 
easily predictable and not yet activated. In the case of 
dynamic processes, there are models and simulations. 
But a simple, more schematic version is also offered by 
diagrams.  A diagram is a form of notation, a type of 
registering information in a visual form, located in 
between word and picture, and thus, according to James 
Elkins, in between poesis and pictura, inscription and 
figure, coded and uncoded, discourse and figure, the 
attenuated and the replete. [9] Each of these poles 
represents a certain logic, structure, and dynamism. 
Diagrams follow rules and their schematism gives us a 
sense of transparency and rationality. Diagrams can be 
orderly, elements are not connected to everything else, 
but only to certain elements, there is a hierarchy, arrows 
or no arrows in the connecting lines. Most importantly, 
they can represent temporal relations, slicing up the 
flow of time onto discrete events. Yet, the challenge 
with representation of self-organization and plasticity 
processes is to capture the entanglement of past, 
present, and future that is so key to them. 
 
Integrated Subjectivity of Neuronal 
Circuits. Neuronal Neuroticism 
This challenge is vivid in the diagrams of neuronal 
activity, particularly in those by psychologist, 
neurophysiologist and engineer Warren McCulloch. 
Like other cyberneticians, he was interested in creating 
mechanisms based on psychic structures, but unlike 
others, he treated them first of all as “existential 
objects” – confused, delusional and neurotic. The case 
of McCulloch is interesting because he was one of the 
first to explore the nature of neural activity from 
psychological/ psychoanalytical and ontological/ 
existentialist points of view. McCulloch's method of 
investigation, which he termed “Experimental 
Epistemology”, involved understanding of each model 
“as lively in its own manner, as a different species, 
posing the question of different forms of life and 
knowing to different circuits.” [10] (In a way, his 
approach was a precursor of the restraint from 
predispositions towards research objects in today's 
science and technology studies, inspired by Latour and 
Haraway). In 1943, together with Walter Pitts, 
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McCulloch co-authored a paper “A Logical Calculus of 
the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity” that became 
seminal in the field of neural nets. There, they proposed 
a series of diagrams that depicted the process of 
neuronal firing, emphasizing the temporal relations 
between individual spikes and showing the complicated 
nature of decision making activity of the neurons. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Firings in the “memory neuron”. Source: Warren 
McCulloch, Walter Pitts, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas 
Immanent in Nervous Activity,” 1943, 128, fig. 1. 
 
 Indeed, contemporary theories of neuroplasticity 
confirm that plasticity in biological nervous systems is 
“dependent upon the spike-timing activity in connected 
neurons.” [11] That implies the crucial role of the 
temporal order of pre- and post-synaptic spiking for the 
resulting longer term effects, such neuronal rewiring – 
strengthening or weakening of connections between 
certain neurons and sets of neurons, and even formation 
of new synapses (which is ultimately the neurological 
basis for continual learning and adaptation). 
 McCulloch's examples include a memory neuron (fig. 
1) that, once activated, keeps  firing itself in every 
subsequent time state in order to stay activated. 
Continuation of action depends on what happened 
before, which in this case means a circular process. In 
his analysis of McCulloch's work, Joseph Dumit 
emphasizes the temporal logic of the neural processes: 
“One of the key properties of a nervous net is that 
looked at from outside, they are deterministic forward 
in time, but undetermined backward. That is, given the 
state of a net at time T, the state of the net at time T+1 
is predictable (to a certain degree). But the state of the 
net at time T-1 is not. In the case where two different 
neurons could have caused the action, the previous state 
might have been either one. A third possibility is that 
there was a misfiring.” [12] The order of firing events 
cannot be re-created according to linear logic, i.e. 
cannot be backtracked. One can know with certainty 
only the state of the neurons in the present moment, but 
not the exact details of the past that led to it. In case of 
the memory neuron, the circular action “'represents' a 
memory, not of the time it was activated, but only of 
having been activated at some indeterminate time in the 
past” (emphasis added). [13] It is a signifier of 'the past 
in general'. What this example shows is that if the 
details of the past are not be fully reconstructable, the 
event cannot be reproduced with accuracy and certainty, 
meaning that each constellation of events in a way is 
unique. 
 Moreover, this example brings up an original 
understanding of subjectivity. Can an entity that, 
apparently, does not have a traceable memory be 
considered a subject or agent of action? Are the circular 
firings enough to constitute its “whole”? According to 
Dumit's interpretation (that also takes into consideration 
Lacan's question about the subject in the circuit), this 
neuron diagram shows that “the subject is the gap in 
time between the two states, traversing them: the circles 
are signifiers, the subject represents the signifier to 
another signifier, repeatedly. The subject is in the 
circuit, integrated.” [14] This means that subjectivity is 
more about the connections, rather than an entity; an 
intertwining of the potential and the actual, rather than 
what has happened and what can be backtracked. The 
complex temporal logic of the memory neuron's firing 
complicates the initial Lacanian conception of the 
subject integrated into the circuit, since the circuit itself 
is constituted by order of events and not their co-
dependent pre-givenness. The repetition of the firing 
can indeed be perceived as a neurotic behavior, an 
expression of some existential hesitation, a form of 
neurosis. The “subject” of the circuit can also be 
understood as the one defining the “truth” or “falsity” 
of a signal (every signal is “on” or “off”, but it is not the 
same as “true” or “false”, which depends on the 
subject's opinion). Each part of a circuit is therefore in a 
sensory relation to another part and produces judgment 
about it (upon which the subsequent decisions would be 
made). “True” can mean “real”, or “valid” and be 
opposite of hallucinatory, illusionary (the signal does 
come, but it is not taken as “real”/ “meaningful”/ 
consequential). [15] This also constitutes specific 
“experience” of both the individual neuron and a 
network that it is engaged in; this experience, in its turn, 
directly affects the adaptation and plasticity processes. 
It may be impossible to avoid neurosis and hesitation 
completely, but they are natural steps on the way of re-
organization of the self. 
  
Marking Transformation. Material Traces 
While the case of McCulloch's diagrams features an 
attempt to describe idealized neuronal firing from an 
existential, or “subjective” point of view, the 
experiments of another well-known cybernetician, 
Gordon Pask, deal with plasticity in autonomous 
electrochemical assemblages. Both neurons and Pask's 
“organic computers” (or “chemical”, according to 
Pickering) are materially organized, but the ways in 
which their dynamic workings can be depicted/ 
grasped/ captured are different. As we could see, 
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neuronal states cannot be backtracked, whereas in case 
of Pask's assemblages each stage of their growth 
processes manifested itself materially, leaving a trace 
that serves as a direct evidence of the occurrent events. 
 Pask is known for his advocacy of more naturally (not 
only algorithmically) adaptive mechanisms of self-
management in complex systems. According to him, 
these mechanisms could be discovered in any medium 
that would satisfy a “high-variety” criterion – a concept 
derived from Ashby’s argument that “a controller can 
control an environment only if it has variety in its states 
greater or equal to the variety in the disturbances on its 
inputs.” [16] This goal went along with the general goal 
of cybernetics (termed by Ashby as Descartes' Dictum): 
to design a device that outperforms the designer 
him/herself. Along with other cyberneticians, Pask also 
agreed that the “performance” of a device would reflect 
its own autonomous thinking, or capacity to adaptively 
construct its own perceptual categories and its own 
means of implementing changes in the world. Yet, he 
put a special emphasis on organic principles of 
evolution of sensory modalities, their “growth”. As 
Pask described it, “a thinking process both builds up 
and employs conceptual categories. These categories 
are defined in terms of attributes which may be 
common to a number of objects in the environment, or 
to other categories or to both. ... Objectively the 
categories are not clear cut, and decisions appear to be 
made between imperfectly specified alternatives. ... The 
overall process is the growth of a concept,” that can be 





Fig. 2. Threads growing in a chemical computer. Source: 
Gordon Pask 1959, 919, fig. 12. 
 
 Through the early and mid 1950's Pask experimented 
with electrochemical assemblages, passing current 
through various aqueous solutions of metallic salts (e.g. 
ferrous sulphate) in order to construct an analog control 
system (fig. 2). The main difference of such a system 
from others in existence was that its design would not 
be pre-specified. As current is passed through the 
electrodes, filaments of iron (or “threads”, as Pask 
called them) grew outward from their tips into the 
liquid between electrodes where maximum lines of 
current were flowing. [18] “These metallic threads have 
a low resistance relative to the solution and so current 
will tend to flow down them if the electrical activation 
is repeated. Consequently, the potentials at the 
electrodes are modified by the formation of threads. If 
there is an ambiguous path, then a thread can bifurcate. 
As the total current entering the system is restricted, 
threads compete for resources. However, when there are 
a number of neighboring unstable structures, the threads 
can amalgamate and form one cooperative structure. 
Over time a network of threads literally grows 
dynamically stable structures.” [19] These 
electrochemical systems, thus, display an elementary 
form of learning. The “reward” consisted of an increase 
in the current supply, a form of positive reinforcement. 
As Andrew Pickering puts it, “the growth of the thread 
structure exhibits a path dependence in time: it depends 
in detail on both the history of inputs through the 
electrodes and on the emerging responses of the system 
to those. The system thus has a memory, so it can 
learn.” [20] The “threads” are unstable: they grow in 
regions of high current density but dissolve back into 
solution otherwise, and they are unpredictable. And yet, 
over time the system as a whole develops abilities to 
recognize patterns of the current flow and respond to 
that. 
 In one of his most famous and intriguing experiments 
– one which can perhaps be seen as a precursor of 
“deep learning” – Pask tested how the “computer” 
would react to sound. It was conducted in 1956 (or 
1957) together with Stafford Beer. A microphone was 
held out of the window to collect the street noise and 
“feed” it to the computer via electrical current. In 
response, the “machine” “grew an ear” and acquired 
new sensitivity to magnetic fields. Beer vividly recalls 
the night of that experiment in his memoirs. The 
decision to check the response to sound came during the 
discussion of Ashby’s concept of ultrastability and the 
ability of machines to adapt to unexpected changes. As 
Pask described it: “We have made an ear and we have 
made a magnetic receptor. The ear can discriminate two 
frequencies, one of the order of fifty cycles per second 
and the other of the order of one hundred cycles per 
second. The “training” procedure takes approximately 
half a day and once having got the ability to recognize 
sound at all, the ability to recognize and discriminate 
two sounds comes more rapidly. [...] The ear, 
incidentally, looks rather like an ear. It is a gap in the 
thread structure in which you have fibrils which 
resonate at the excitation frequency.” [21] The 
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experiment was significant as, according to Beer, this 
“was the first demonstration either of us had seen of an 
artificial system’s potential to recognize a filter which 
would be conducive to its own survival and to 
incorporate that filter into its own organization.” [22] 
 The “ear” experiment is illustrative of Pask's method, 
which is also similar to McCulloch's “Experimental 
Epistemology”, with the only difference that it does not 
stop at the observation level and includes more active 
participation of the researcher. The observer, in Pask's 
case, creates change by intervening into the initial 
processes. The metallic threads can be seen as both 
graphical, representational and live, performative 
entities. This methodology, thus, goes well with 
Andrew Pickering's idea of performative ontology: “we 
should understand science not as a body of 
representations of the world, but as a mode of 
performative engagement with it.” [23] 
 This experiment also helps to address in a new way 
the question of the self in the circuit: the circuit will 
have to include not only input-output relations, but also 
the observer/ researcher that sets the parameters of the 
experiment (even in minimum way). The observer 
becomes a part of a larger self, and hence the whole 
question can be reverted: it is not the observer having 
impact on the system, but the system “absorbs” his/her 
actions, offering a feeling of wonder and excitement at 
such a collaboration. There are also still questions, such 
as: how an external observer determines when a device 
or agent has acquired a new sensory modality/ 
“perceptual concept” (the problem of recognizing 
functional emergence); what the self-constructing, 
epistemically autonomous (“organizationally closed”) 
observer-participants and their networks be like. [24] 
 
Fate of Tricking the Fate 
The discussion of the observer effect helps us to 
transition to the third case – an artistic installation “1,4 
... 19” (2014) by “Where the Dogs Run” collective (fig. 
3, 4, 5). Art sets up another approach, other than 
scientific one (observations of neuronal behavior by 
McCulloch), or more pragmatic and applied ones (in the 
end, Pask's goal was to use the “organic computers” for 
managing real factories). Using similar principles – 
creating and observing self-organizing systems – art 
more than any other field emphasizes aesthetic 
parameters as an investigative tool. In addition to the 
sensations of surprise and wonder, artists attempt to 
evoke and cultivate more complex “existential” 
feelings. Often, as in the case of today's interactive art 
(which is part of the longer history of “cybernetic art” 
proper), the viewer is invited to participate in the 
behavior of a system. [25] The effects most worthy of 
discussion are usually not the straight-on excitement, 
but confusion, perplexity, and new questions (utterable 
and not). 
 The work by the group “Where the Dogs Run” 
collides the virtual into physical reality, and thus makes 
us return to the issue of matter-form-information 
interaction and the ontological, epistemological and 
aesthetic effects it produces. “1, 4 ... 19” features the 
interaction between the movements of a live organism, 
a mouse put in a labyrinth with controlled dynamic 
structure, and its virtual doubles that embody the 
decisions that the real mouse did not make. The 
movement of the mouse is followed by a camera. Every 
time it makes a turn, its virtual doubles make the 
opposite decision. To prevent the “collapse” between 
the real and a virtual mouse, labyrinth's corridors can be 
closed (the real mouse runs into real walls that appear in 
response to the movement of the virtual mouse). The 
system is constructed to demonstrate the presence of the 
unrecognized dimension of the alternative possibilities 
to all our everyday actions. What does it mean to make 
a decision? What does it involve? What happens if you 
simply avoid/ await making it, and linger in the in-
between zone? The observations of two different mice' 
behaviors showed that indeed, the more experienced 
one figured out the ways to trick the control mechanism 
by hiding in the corners or simply sitting still (in that 
case the virtual mice do not appear and all her 
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Fig. 3, 4, 5. 1,4 ...19, 2014, Where the Dogs Run, mixed 
media. Courtesy of the artists. 
  
 Virtualization serves here a role of an enacted 
diagram – a model answering a question “what if?” put 
in action. The screen displays a simulation of a possible 
course of events. It is both a doubling of the existing 
world, and its expansion: making visible the invisible, 
activating and playing out the potential scenarios. The 
simulation here informs the real right away, and in this 
sense it is not a predictive model. The interaction 
between the virtual and the actual is continuous. This 
process can also be read along the lines proposed by a 
German philosopher Vera Bühlmann in her analysis of 
the ontological aspects of modeling – as “creative 
management of the frame of reference within which 
'something' takes up its specific meaning.” [26] The 
virtual model itself becomes literally a “frame of 
reference” for the real mouse's actions, and the meaning 
is what the mouse makes of its own experience in this 
system. Each individual mouse can interpret the “on” 
and “off” (open and closed doors) signals in its own 
way, as “true”/ “false”, “relevant” or not, with its own 
behavioral consequences.  
 “1, 4 ... 19” shows an interplay between a situation 
that is unfolding in a given time and space and is 
observable by the third parties, and the processes that 
can possibly be happening in the mind of a mouse – the 
logical calculations that are presented as the 
doppelganger mice movements. This subjective 
processing is objectified; the whole future “fate” is laid 
out on a screen. But the logical schema is not only a 
representation, but an enactment of the relationship 
between the layers of the real and the virtual (the 
possible course of events). The real events are 
immediately translated into a logical algorithm and 
played back in a form of other real events (closing 
walls), provoking the mouse to adjust its actions and to 
think of the consequences of every move. Observing 
this process, the viewer is also caught in the moment of 
translation, attempting to imagine the connections 
between the events before they actually happen, i.e. to 
anticipate the movements of the mouse, almost to live 
through this experience for and with it. This challenge 
of imagining through an experience is what makes the 
artistic strategy special. The viewer-observer is not only 
a reference point (as it is in Pask's experiment), but a 
valid experiencing subject – troubled, disoriented and in 
search for solutions, together with the animal in the 
maze. The diagram of possible courses of events drawn 
on the screen is not a precise mathematical model, but 
rather an intuitive imaginary version of multiple parallel 
realities coming together. The algorithm behind the 
model includes both calculable statistical factors and 
the parameter of randomness. The latter can also be 
compared to the indeterminateness of the neuron's 
stimulus – if one attempts to reconstruct it – in 
McCulloch's example. The 'circuit' here has its 'gaps' 
too, and they remain there to be filled by the acts of the 
viewer's imagination (along with the effectively active 
mouse). 
 What is the meaning and status of the pathways of the 
virtual mice? Can they be read as traces, and do they 
help with predicting what would happen next? Multiple 
lines filling the passages of the maze on the screen are 
not marks of the past, but alternatives for the 
movements happening in the present. Thus, they 
compress in one image past, present and future – all at 
once. Yet, their role is different than of the arrows in 
McCulloch's diagram, which shows firings that took 
place in some speculative, indeterminate, but past. It is 
also different than the role of metallic threads in Pask's 
experiments, where electro-chemical constellations 
“train” the system over time, again – by taking place 
over and over, and eventually becoming a past. To be 
more precise, the 'traces' in “1, 4 ... 19” are represented 
by the video-images of virtual mice (edited recordings 
of live mice running through the same corridors), i.e. 
they are not only vectors, but alternative beings, 
convincing of their realness. The diagrammatic 'schema' 
of potential actions is shown here in a form of a video – 
a mirrored image of the real labyrinth structure. This is 
another technique that produces a very particular 
aesthetic effect – the surrogate non-actual realities 
feeling real. 
 It is relevant also to return to the question of the 
subject of action and how to define it in this case. Is it 
an individual mouse, or the circuit – a mouse together 
with its doppelgangers? Are the virtual mice only the 
limiting conditions, the “frame of reference”, or – as 
representations of the potential actions for the real 
mouse in present time – are they visualizations of its 
mental processing, i.e. its own products? An answer to 
this question would mark out the overall stand on what 
exactly the factor of in/determination is – in this work 
and more generally.  
 
Conclusion 
The described systems are examples representing the 
wide spectrum of how plasticity can manifest itself 
organically and artificially. Each of them answers in its 
own way the posed questions about the place of the 
selfhood, temporal logic, connections between matter 
and information, virtual and actual, levels of 
controllability and the role of the observer. In all three 
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cases considered above we observe relational circuits 
that – as the people behind them attempt to demonstrate 
– may be more open, plastic and indeterminate than it 
seems at first: a neuron firing with more probability if it 
is activated several times just before that; metallic salts 
concentrating around stronger flows of electric current 
time after time; and a live organism trying to apply 
learned experience to the present circumstances by 
playing through imaginative scenarios of possible 
actions. One of the important issues that remains to be 
explored is the relevance and the potential parallels 
between the ways of being and experience of the micro-
material structures (be it neurons or iron particles) and 
the human perspective on cognitive processes: how we 
think we think (including how we think a mouse 
thinks). Understanding plasticity in terms of its 
structural qualities helps to create predictable 
representational models. At the same time, as we saw, 
not all of them may work (“1, 4 ... 19” is an ironic take 
exactly on this). Their purpose is not only to predict 
possible future behavior of a system, but to provoke us 
to reflect on what it means and how it may feel to have 
a machinic diagram within oneself. These models 
should find ways of representing openness of the 
system for participation and allow for performative 
manifestation of alternative possibilities, i.e. include the 
dimension of the virtual and the potential as a means to 
break away from deterministic temporal logic. 
Experiencing the enactment of such models, then, may 
already be an exercise of plasticity. 
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